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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 




OF UTAH and 
CONSOLIDATED WESTERN 





BRIEF O·F PETITIO·NER 
STATE:JIENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Petitioner, Benner J. Carling, appeals the decision 
and order of the respondent, Industrial Commission of 
lTtah (hereinafter called the Commission) denying com-
pensation for permanent partial disability under th0 pro-
visions of Title 35, Chapter 1, lTtah Code AnnotatPd 1953, 
a.s amended. The Commission, in denying compensa-
tion for petitioner's injury received while \vorking as an 
employee of and in the course of his employmPllt \vith 
respondent Consolidated Western Steel, Division lT nit0d 
States Steel Corporation (hereinafter ealled employ<'r), 
apparently based its order upon the finding that thPl'(' 
was "no eompetent evidence in the record to support 
the single incident as the cauAe of he a ring loss." 
1 
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The petitioner sought such compensation award from 
respondent employer because of an impairment to his 
hearing s-nffered while using an air gun to tamp sand into 
a metal pipe. Plaintiff contends that the Commission's 
action in denying an award for accidental injury was im-
proper and unreasonable. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The petitioner's application for benefits under the 
Workmen's Compensation Act was referred by the Com-
mission, as provided by law, to a Medical Panel for find-
ings upon the question of a hearing loss as presented by 
the application. The Panel made a finding on the extent of 
petitioner's hearing impairment. Objections to that find-
ing were timely filed by petitioner and the proceeding, a 
transcript of which is a part of this record, was held. The 
purpose of the hearing according to petitioner's under-
standing, was to permit petitioner to adduce medical evi-
dence to establish the extent of petitioner's hearing 
impairment. 
The Commission issued its order denying the peti-
tioner any a'vard on the basis that petitioner did not 
suffer an industrial accident under Title 35, Chapter 1 
of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner 
in his application for rehearing before the Commission 
offered to produce additional and independent testimony 
relative to the incident causing petitioner's hearing loss 
but such application was denied by the Commission. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Petitioner seeks an order of this Court Yacating 
and setting aside the decision and order of the respondent 
Commission and remanding this case to the Commission 
for determination of the extent of petitioner's disabilitY 
with instructions that an a'vard he made in petitioner ., .. s 
behalf for benefits as provided by the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act for that disability. 
2 
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STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
On August 31, 1960, the petitioner, while an em-
ployee of respondent employer and while in the course 
of his employment, used an air gun to tamp sand into 
some metal pipes (R. 9 and 10). The petitioner, after 
applying the metal bit attached to the air gun against 
the metal pipes at full air velocity for an approximate 
period of from 20 to 25 minutes (R. 98) became aware of 
a change in his ability to hear and discriminate sounds 
(R. 99). Immediately upon noting such chang·ed condi-
tion petitioner left his work station and reported to his 
immediate foreman, 'vhose name 'vas Delwin Shepard 
as follo,vs: "Delwin, I have had something happen. I 
can't hear. I have lost my hearing." (R. 99) The peti-
tioner then ceased tamping the sand into the pipe by use 
of an air gun and this work was then performed by an-
other employee. (R. 99, 100) That day after work the 
petitioner reported to the employer's medical dispensary 
concerning such condition. Upon learning that the doc-
tors had already left the dispensary, petitioner reported 
to such dispensary the following day. (R. 99) Since 
that date petitioner's hearing has been permanently im-
paired (R. 18, 19 and 71, Ex. No.5). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE RECORD FROlVI THE COMMIS-
SION HEARING ESTABLISHES THAT PE-
TITIONER SlTFFER~JD AN ACCIJ)ENTAI~ 
INJURY ON AUGUST 31, 1960, WHII.JE USING 
AN AIR GUN IN THE COURSE OF HIS l1~M­
PLOYMENT WITH RESPONDENT El\fPLO'{-
ER RESULTING IN A PERMA_NENT PAR.-
TIAL HEARING DISABILITY. 
Respondent Commission in its order state~ "There 
is no competent evidence in the record to support the 
3 
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single incident [the us of air gun on August 31, 1960] as 
the cause of hearing loss." Petitioner testified at the 
hearing a.s follows : 
''A. I "'~as using the air gun only on the tamp-
ing of the pipe. 
Q. Well, in filling the pipe with sand, you were 
using an air gun ~ 
A. No. Like Mr. Taylor stated, we just hoisted 
it up in this big drum, on top, and then dipped it 
out with a. bucket into the funnel and filled each 
p1pe. 
"Q. All right. Now then, "Then the pipe "~as 
filled, you used the air gun~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now what bitt was on the air gun 'vhen you 
beganf 
A. Well, in the process of this I tried to figure 
a bitt of my own. I manufactured one out of a 
chisel, to fit the gun. I put a steel piece of plate 
that fit partway around the-
Q. Contour of the pipe f 
A. Contour of the pipe, yes. And welded it 
on the chisel. And I started out using that. 
Q. Now when you were using the gun, to 'vhat 
extent did you turn the gun on~ Did you haYe it 
on at a slow speed, a. moderate speed, or did you 
have it on at full speed~ 
A. Well, I used the gun- On that particular 
gun you could just turn partly air into it, and it 
would just- It wouldn't, you know, it "~ouldn ,t 
give you a heavy charge. Or rattle. So all the 
time I was using it I poured it on it. 
Q. Wl1en you say you poured it on it, "~hat do 
you mean~ You had full-
4 
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Q. -velocity~ 
A. Full velocity of the air. 
Q. Now did you use the same bitt all the 'vay 
through~ 
A. Yes. In one sense. After, oh, just a few 
minutes, I busted this contour piece of steel off. 
It wouldn't stay on there. Then I went back and 
'velded some more, and cut off the ears and welded 
it flat back on, and started over again. And I 
didn't get very far with that, until that popped 
off again. It just wouldn't hold on. This high 
carbon steel, on the bitt, it wouldn't hold onto 
this steel plug that I had used to tamp with. And 
then I went over to the grinding stone, and that 
busted off the second time, and I went over to the 
grinding stone and ground the chisel off flat. 
THE REFEREE: Can't we stay with the pipe~ 
A. And went back to work. 
~IR. YEATES: Q. Well, how long a time, if you 
can recall, how long a time were you actually hold-
ing the gun, using it against the pipe~ 
A. Oh, I imagine after I got the chisel back 
in shape, the last time where it had busted off, I 
probably went approximately some place bet,veen 
20 and 25 minutes. From the bottom on up. I had 
to change elevations as I went. 
Q. So you did this against various points of 
the pipe~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And after you had done this, then they 
added more? Did they add more sand to the 
pipe1 
A. Well, all the time the fellow that was help-
ing me, working with, he was on top. And as I 
5 
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beat the pipe, and the sand settled do,vn in it, he 
kept filling it in to keep it full. 
Q. Had you ever done this type of work for 
this company before~ This particula: th~ng . of 
holding a.n air gun against the pipe, filling It with 
sand~ 
A. Well, I had never. Not particularly this 
type. You mean for this company~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. Never before with a chipping gun. 
Q. Why did you stop doing the work on the 
pipe~ Did you complete the work before you 
stopped~ 
A. No. No, I didn't get through. I can't re-
call exactly just how it happened, but I stopped, 
and things- The noise, the general noise around 
the place there, which is you can hear machines. 
There is trains and stuff running around, and 
they just-
Q. Well, were they muffled~ Or-
A. They were muffled down. I couldn't hear. 
So I got off the scaffold and went straight to my 
foreman, Delwin Shepherd, and told him of it. 
Q. What did you say to him f 
..~._L\.. I told him, I said: "Delwin, I haYe had 
something happen. I can't hear." I said: "I haYe 
lost my hearing." 
Q. Did you continue 'vorking on the pipe after 
that~ 
A. Well, I went up on top, and my helper that 
was working with me he finished sanding it or 
beating the pipe. ' 
6 
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Q. Did you go to the dispensary that night 1 
A. Yes. I did after work. But the doctor had 
left. 
Q. And then was it the next day that you finally 
saw the doctor at the dispensary 1 
A .. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall what doctor that was 1 
A. Well, I can't recall his name. I don't know 
the name~ of the doctors up there. It 'vas a fairly 
young fellow. He- wore glasses. I couldn't say 
what his name was. 
~IR. YEATES: I think that's all. 
THE REFEREE: One moment. 
(Discussion off the record.) 
~IR. YEATES: Q. Had you ever had this same 
condition of hearing that you noticed after doing 
this work on the pipes 1 Had this same condition 
ever been prese-nt before~ 
A. No.'' (R. 96 to 100) 
Petitioner's testimony was supported and corrobo-
rated by testimony of Dr. Dean Gray, ear specialist, a~ 
follows: 
''MR. YEATES: Q. Excuse me. There is onP 
thing that I want to get clear here. Dr. Gray-
and I refer this to Mr. Wiesley - anything that 
you want to state as to the reasons why you medi-
cally wanted Mr. Finger]e to examine-
''A. I might say this. For three purpose~ I 
sent him there. Number one is I wished him to 
confirm the findings that I had reerivctl in mr 
own office. Number two is I wished him to rule 
7 
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upon this man's subjective response to testing, 
which is not in the report, and which I had been 
reassured by him verbally. Number three is I 
wished speech discrimination. Now the first one, 
that of confirming my findings, is in the report 
here. In the pure tone audiogram which he did, 
and which compares with my own audiogram. 
Number three, and speech discrimination, he did 
obtain this. He found that Mr. Carling-" (R. 17) 
''A. Now on speech reception he got- By run-
ning speech, that required a decibel level or sound 
pressure level of 60 decibels. This is not correct 
either. It required 60 decibels of intensity for him 
to hear on the left. 75 decibels of intensity on 
the right. His speech discrimination was found 
to be 90% on the left, and 75% on the right. The 
particular record which Mr. Fingerle uses, and 
which I am acquainted with and have used myself, 
allow for 100% discrimination in a person with 
normal hearing. We feel that anything below this 
is an abnormal discrimination. 
My reason for wishing discrimination is that 
on a pure tone audiogram one is unable to actually 
define how 'veil a patient understands speech, 
which after all is the important thing in a person's 
a hili ty to communicate. Not ho"r 'Yell he hears 
one particular isola ted tone, but his a bili t' to 
reeei ve and understand speech. Discrimin~.tion 
does not change. Regardless of intensity of sound, 
if a man has 75% intensity, or-excuse me-70% 
of discrimination, it matters little 'Yhether you 
play something to him with 100 or 200 decibel~ of 
intensity. His discrimination does not change. 
It remains permanent, and at 75%, regardless of 
the intensity. I did this particularly also because 
of the hearing aid, because in this matter 'Yith a 
hearing aid to improve this man's hearing he still 
8 
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will only hear 75% with a hearing aid in the 
right ear. 
Another factor was that Mr. Carling does not 
demonstrate in speech any particular loss for pro-
nouncing consonants. Between one and two thou-
sand cycles per second he has a. hearing loss which 
is sufficient to have caused him - would it have 
been a congenital loss, and ha.d occurred since he 
wa.s a. youth, or since he was born - to have af-
fected his speech. That he- would not pronounce 
his consonants clearly, especially with a discrimi-
nation loss, as he exhibited in this test. I there-
fore felt it was important to determine whether 
this could have been a pre-existing condition, at 
least as this particular loss, or whether something 
that possibly could have happened more recently. 
People who have lost their speech recently will 
not exhibit a speech defect. Those who have had 
it for a number of years, or during their life, with 
this amount of loss will exhibit a definite speech 
defect when they speak. So that 'vas the reason 
for requesting discrimination. 
Q . Dr. Gray, when you are referring to this 
matter of discrimination- for just the purpose of 
further explication - they have a speech recep-
tion threshold, and then they refer here by spon-
dees; is that the correct pronunciation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell us what that refers to? 
A. Well, we test people by spondees, 'v hich 
are multiple syllable words, where it's two or three 
syllables is different between a word such as 
"the," or the word "itself," which are one srl-
lable. A spondee consists of two or more syllables, 
such as ''hardware,'' ''hotdog,'' ''staircase.'' 
This will allow the patient to better identify the 
9 
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word when he hears it. Running speech will mix 
spondees and single syllable words, and the 
threshold that these people hear will vary usually 
between a spondee, which they can pick up gen-
erally the more readily than they can running 
speech frequently because of the single words 
that they will find in their speech. 
Q. And this was-
A. He did better on spondees than he did 
running speech. 
Q. And this is identified in the report by 1Ir. 
Fingerle? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As shown on these? 
A. Yes. 
Q. According to the first and second line under 
the moneral ( ? ) ? 
A. The second section of the report, which is 
testing of speech. 
Q. Well, now, based upon your O\Vll examina-
tion, and the report of !fr. Fingerle, do you haYe 
a considered medical opinion as to \Yhether the 
los& of hearing - based upon your report, and 
the statements of 1Ir. Carling- \Yere congenital-? 
A. I definitely rule out a congenital loss in this 
man. 
Q. And based upon your reports, or the report 
of Mr. Fingerle and the examination of ~Ir. Carl-
ing, what would be your considered medical opin-
ion as to the cause of the impairment of the hear-
ing in Mr. Car ling's case? 
A. His particular hearing test \Yhich \Ye re-
ceived, of course - as many of you are a.\vare _ 
10 
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\Yould be a hearing loss which could be found in 
various types of eases. Whether it would be from 
an acoustic. trauma, as we usually refer to this 
particular injury, or whether it was a possibility 
of a chronic. progressive hearing loss, referred to 
frequently as presbycusis, was premature in this 
particular gentleman, due to his age. Ho\vever, 
from the report that he gave me his hearing had 
been good, and that working around the noise that 
he had had this sudden loss. 
Now I of course questioned him, and he stated 
that he had a prolonged history of exposure to 
loud noises. Now when we think of acoustic 
trauma, of course- espeeially in occupations such 
as canning, or foundries, or boilermakers - you 
generally can think in terms of a more prolonged 
exposure. Although the literature of course con-
firms that people can on one sudden exposure -
much less than even a blast sound, but one sudden 
exposure to soundo, with the proper predisposing 
causes 'Yhich cannot be predetermined - v.rill ac-
tually suffer an injury from acoustic trauma. 
It was my first and initial thought that possibly 
with his many years of being in this type of work, 
or this type of work where he was suffered, that 
possibly this was a long exposure and a long time 
of acoustic trauma which brought this on. But I 
questioned him carefully, and of course his \Yife, 
who maintained that this was an abrupt loss, and 
that he of course maintained that thiH time he had 
a sudden ringing in his ears, whieh would go along 
with this injury to the cochlear, \\~hich is the nPr\·e 
ending. 
Under those circumstanceH, and with the re-
port of Mr. Fingerle, I would be obliged to state 
that he did suffer acoustic trauma on this pa rticu-
lar instance. I of course am not aware of any 
11 
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audiograms previous to this time. The total 
amount of loss. Whether it was from zero or nor-
mal hearing down to where he is at the present 
time, or whether he possibly had some hearing loss 
before. I am not aware· of these. I cannot make 
an accurate statement as to the total amount of 
hearing loss that he suffered on this one particu-
lar instance. But his history and my findings led 
me to diagnose the case as injury to acoustic 
trauma. 
Q. And this was traceable to the incident re-
ported by Mr. Carling to you of using this gun~ 
A. 1\{r. Carling, yes. His history I accepted. 
Q. All right. Now you spoke about predeter-
mining the disposal of a person on the matter of 
acoustic trauma. Would you briefly explain that 
further1 What you meant by that statement? 
A. Yes. Of course acoustic trauma first be-
came common in the literature maybe a decade 
ago, as people were beginning to be exposed to 
loud industrial noises. Much of the :first work was 
done in animal experimentation, and of course 
some human subjects, in which there was fre-
quently a characteristic loss of hearing at around 
4,000 cycles per second. l\{uch more "Tork has 
been done, especially in the field of high industrial 
noise. Not such as jets, in 'vhich you might find 
a particular frequency, but industrial noises such 
as boilerma.king, and I'm not fully a"~ are of this 
particular man's environment where he suffered 
this, but the spectra of sound covers the entire 
auditory spectrum. And they find that in these 
particular people the hearing loss is not char-
acteristic in one particular cycle, but we usuallv 
go through the broad range of hearing. · 
'Vork has been done in giving people \Yhat they 
call auditory loading, and taking employees ,vh~ 
12 
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are being employed by a company and actually 
testing their hearing with various auditory load-
ing. By this I mean doing an audiogram, sub-
jecting them to loud noises and then retesting 
them, to see if there actually has been damage, 
whether permanent or temporary, and see if they 
might pick out various employees that would be 
subject to acoustic trauma. Literature indicates 
that there has been no good way of selecting em-
ployees who might be subject or might have a pre-
disposing type of ear to acoustic trauma. That a 
hundred employees, you just have to take your 
chances on employing them, or else protecting 
them with protective devices when they are ex-
posed to industrial noise. 
So in th.is particular case Mr. Carling, for ex-
ample, possibly the only predisposing cause had 
an employer taken this man and found that he 
had already a predisposing nerve loss of signifi-
cance, then they would not be able to detect wheth-
er he might be more subject to hearing· loss from 
loud noises than another patient. All they could 
do is say that it would be risky business to employ 
him, because if he did suffer acoustic trauma., in 
him, it would be of more serious nature than some-
body who had normal hearing and who might well 
tolerate a certain amount of industrial noise, even 
if he did suffer small acoustic trauma. 
Q. So this would mean that the decibels of auy 
particular sound, the resulting action upon a per-
son's nerves and hearing it would vary as to thP 
individual; is that right~ 
A. That's true. Of course you take the aver-
age, and you know that certain lPvPls, 'vhieh i~ 
generally considered to be around somewhere 
about a hundred decibels on up, which will in gen-
eral be the type of noise which will injure thP 
13 
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normal human ear. Now both as to the level of 
noise, there is variance between patients. Some 
patients will react to much less noise than other 
patients. In other words that they can be ex-
posed to a lesser sound than this, and still have 
acoustic trauma. Likewise, the length of exposure 
varies from patient to patient. Some patients 
may work in a factory for 30 years and suffer al-
most no acoustic trauma. More than you might 
find in the average population. There will be 
other patients, of course, or employees, who on one 
brief exposure will actually suffer acoustic 
trauma. 
Q. Does the abruptness of a hearing change 
indicate one condition as opposed to another~ 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Of a hearing loss~ I mean an abruptness of 
a hearing loss, or a marked change in the per-
son's ability to hear every-day speech~ For in-
stance if a person has a certain ability to hear 
everyday speech, under everyday conditions, and 
then is subject to some acoustic trauma, and then 
there is an abrupt change in his ability to I "'\Yould 
say converse in everyday speech under everyday 
conditions~ 
A. You're speaking of speech no"T -? 
Q. Well,-
A. Well, they're different. N O"'\Y let me just 
go through this. Work has been experimentallv 
on human subjects, in "'\Yhich they have taken no1:_ 
mal subjects and who are being employed in a fac-
tory, in exposure to loud sounds. They ,viii then 
retest them at the end of the day, for ex~mple, and 
find evidence of temporary, or in some cases- but 
more rarely - permanent damage. UsuallY it'~ 
a. temporary thing, and these patients actuall;r 
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have a much lower score than they did. Not much, 
hut I mean one which is statistically significant. 
A lower score on their hearing test than they had 
in the morning preceding their work. This, of 
course, over an eight-hour period - or even less 
time, whatever it might be - is one which is us-
ually a temporary loss. 
As far as speech, a person who does suffer for 
example a sudden nerve loss, if a person has a 
disease which might eradicate his hearing totally 
in a period of almost a few seconds, these patients 
will suffer no severe difference in their speech. 
There is none detectible, except after a few years. 
Gradually they begin to lose some of their pro-
nunciation, but from one day to_ another you would 
not be able to tell from a person's speech, except 
that he is more likely to speak louder. \Vhen he 
comes in to not hearing his own voice, he will gen-
erally speak much louder. 
Q. Well, I'm referring to-when I was saying 
ability to converse in everyday speech-I'm say-
ing his ability to hear the other person, and there-
fore to respond and to communicate. 
A. Oh, yes. Of course if he had a severe acous-
tic trauma, there would be an obvious change in his 
response to people. 
Q. Well, what I was referring to, if therf' 'vas 
an abrupt change in this ability for just everyday 
communication, traceable to one incident, does this 
have significance? Or am I-
A. Why don't you say the queRtion ovpr 
again 1 
Q. Well, if I can put it in a clear way- just 
being a layman in these matters - but if there is 
a significant and abrupt change in n person's n bil-
ity to communicate-
15 
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MR. BROWN: I would object to that question. I 
think it assumes things not in evidence. I ha:e 
heard no evidence that there has been a change In 
his ability to hear normal conversation. 
MR. YEATES: All right. I'm just referring to 
any individual. I'm not referring this question to 
Mr. Carling. 
MR. BRowN : If you can put this as hypothetical 
question. 
1\IR. YEATES: All right. 
THE REFEREE: Surely. 
MR. YEATES: Q. Dr. Gray, if an individual has 
the ability of everyday communication, under ev-
eryday circumstances, and then is subjected to a 
loud noise, and immediately following that noise 
there is a abrupt change and impairment in his 
ability for everyday communication, would this 
have significance~ In determining the type of in-
jury or impairment, rather than a change that had 
been non-progressive? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And 'vhat significance "\vould you place upon 
this~ 
A. If a. person \\7ere to come to me, and state 
that yesterday he felt fine, that he awoke this 
morning, or during this day his hearing ''Tas 
much worse, of course this 'vould rule out certain 
causes of hearing loss, or congenital loss, or pro-
gressive hearing loss, or hereditary hearing loss. 
Such things as conductive loss. As otosclerosis. 
It would definitely limit it to some of the verv 
common, or '"'hatever cause might lead to suddei1 
hearing loss. Such as an obstruction of the audi-
tory artery, "\vhich "rould have a sudden hearino-
loss. A virol disease, in 'vhirh the labyrinth ''""a~ 
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affected, and they would have a sudden loss. An 
injury, acoustic trauma., and more commonly such 
as a blast, in which a. person had been exposed to a 
sudden blast, which is a common cause of sudden 
and total hearing loss, or at least marked hearing 
loss. So that the abrupt change in one's hearing 
would certainly seem to limit it to a. certain group 
of causes for hea-ring loss, rather than the whole 
spectrum of causes. 
Q. Dr. Gray, did you- on your examination 
-test for all these various things you referred to 
with l\Ir. Carling~ 
A. Well, there is little way of testing actually 
the man's history. I related to his history, and I 
have gone through his first testimony that he 
stated that his particular hearing loss was sud-
den. We questioned him of course about his fam-
ily, for the possibility of hereditary nerve loss, 
which was not elicited in my conversation with 
him. We of course ruled out the possibility of a 
conductive hearing loss, which is of a different 
type and which would definitely rule out an acous-
tic trauma. From the history we could rule out a 
congenital, and by his speech of course, a congeni-
tal type of hearing loss. And I asked him had he 
suffered any sudden dizzy spells, or had he ever 
noticed any nausea or vomiting associated "~ith 
dizziness, which would tend to rule out a la hyrin-
thitis, such a virol disease. 
Q. Did he reply in the negative or affirmative 1 
A. Well, he of course implied that he had not 
suffered from these causes, nor was there any his-
tory that would suggest these other diseases. Of 
course obstruction of an auditory artery usually 
leads to abrupt and total hearing loss. Not al\\,.ays, 
but frequently more than he has, and it generally 
is more limited to one ear rather than both. Sueh 
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as this man had. So - in ans"\ver to your question 
- part of it is through history of course, and then 
there is some testing, or :findings on physical ex-
amination, that would rule out these other causes 
for hearing loss.'' (R. 18 through 29) 
The physical circumstances, nature of the injury and 
the conduct of petitioner forceably add credence and re-
liability to his uncontested testimony. This case is not 
one wherein the uncontroverted testimony of the claim-
ant was not subject to contradiction had the testimony in 
fact been unreliable. Unlike the circumstances existing in 
Smith v. Industrial Comrnission of Utah, 140 P. 2d 314, 
petitioner's own testimony amply affords respondent 
employer an opportunity to refute it through testimony of 
other witnesses and by employer's own records. The 
reason respondent employer did not attempt to do so is 
obvious and demonstrates the reliability of such evidence. 
In the Smith case the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
''The commission apparently concluded that 
plaintiff's testimony 'Yas inconsistent with other 
conceded facts in the case .sand on that ground de-
nied his application. This appears from the fol-
lowing excerpt from the decision : 
'Applicant's recital of an accident is denied, 
but there is no evidence in the record to the con-
trary. However, there are some Yery significant 
facts which we cannot overlook. Applicant con-
tinued on the job and made no report to his em-
ployer until after he 'Yent to Ft. Douglas for a 
physical examination on June 5 or 6, 1!1-!~. .A.J 
that time he 'Yas adYised by an armY phYsician 
that he had a hernia. On June 7, 19±~, i1e "~as 
examined by Dr. Silas S. Smith "~ho confirmed the 
report of the arn1y physician. Later on June ~3, 
1942, applicant 'vent ~o the hospital for surgical 
treatment. He 'vas discharged from the hospital 
on J nne 27, 1942, and 'Ycnt to "~ork on ..._c\_ugnst 7, 
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1942, for another employer, having left the de-
fendant Continental Building Company employ on 
May 9, 1942 .... ' 
''The weakness of plaintiff's case is that there 
is no evidence other than his own testimony that 
he had any accident, or the details or effects there-
of, and he is an interested witness. By the na-
ture of the accident it is impossible to contradict 
his testimony. Such a situation presents an op-
portunity for imposition.'' 
In that case the Supreme Court concluded: 
'' ... In view of the fact that applicant 'vas the 
only \Yitness to testify to the accident, to the re-
sulting sensations, and to his reasons for not re-
porting it to his employer, and the further fact 
that these facts were by their very nature exclu-
sively within his own knowledge and therefore 
could not be controverted by other testimony, the 
commission could reasonably refuse to believe his 
testimony, which they apparently did.'' 
See also Ka1;a.Zinakis v. Industrial Commission, 246 
Pac. 698, 703. 
In the instant case, the facts and circumstances dem-
onstrating that petitioner suffered an accidental injury 
on the date in question as testified to by petitioner \vere 
not exclusively within his O\Vll knowledge. That peti-
tioner has, in fact, had a loss of hearing was stipulated to 
at the hearing (R. 71). Had petitioner's hearillg im-
pairment prior to August 31, 1960, been that 'vhich was 
established by the evidence, such condition would have 
been readily discernible to his employer's supervisors 
and to those who worked with him. The fact that no sueh 
testimony was offered in this regard is significant. 
When the accidental hearing impairment occurred, pe-
titioner immediately reported it to his employer's fore-
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man. Thereafter petitioner reported to the dispensary 
because of his loss of hearing. Had such testimony been 
lacking in credibility and truthfulness, the employer had 
ample means of so demonstrating. That employer did not 
elect to do makes it arbitrary and unreasonable for re-
spondent Commission to disregard such testimony or to 
contend that there is not competent evidence in the record 
to support the proposition that petitioner's hearing im-
pairment derived from the use of the air gun on .L\_u-
gust 31, 1960. See Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc., v. 
Welling, 339 P. 2d 1011. 
Such testimony as supported by Dr. Gray, the other 
evidence and the particular facts and circumstances and 
by employer's failure or election not to contest it makes 
the testimony of petitioner of such persuasive force that 
the respondent Commission could not reasonabl~T find it 
\vas not true. 
As observed by this Court in Jones '· California 
Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640: 
''If the commission could go so far as to refuse 
to believe such evidence in the absence of anything 
of substance to refute it, then it certainly ''ould 
possess arbitary powers with no restrictive reYiew 
left aYailable to the litigant. .. ~" 
See also Nicholson Y. Industrial Connn iss-ion of Utah 
(1964) 389 P. 2d 730 \Yherein it was held that in passing 
upon the propriety of a commission a:w·ard den~ing \York-
men's compensation benefits to an employee the revie"~­
ing court has a dut~~ of examining the record to see 
whether the commission arbitrarily disregarded compe-
tent evidence in favor of unsubstantial contradictorY 
evidence. · 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE RESPONDENT C01IJ\IISSION 
CANNOT PROPERLY CONTEND THAT 
THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT CO~IPETENT 
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT 
THE PETITIONER'S CLAI~i THAT HIS 
HEARING IMP AIRJ\IIENT STE~IS FRO:l\1 THE 
USE OF THE AIR GUN ON AUGUST 31, 1960, 
IN VIEW OF THE RESPONDENT COMMIS-
SION'S ACTION IN PREVENTING OR DIS-
SUADING PETITIONER FROM INTRO-
DUCING ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE ON SUCH 
QUESTION. 
In addition to the petitioner's testimony and the 
testimony of Dr. Gray petitioner 'Yas prepared to supply 
additional details in regards to his hearing impairment 
and to trace it to the use of the air gun on August 31, 
1960, and to fully corroborate it by independent ''"'itnesses 
whom were available at the hearing. The Referee for 
respondent Commission stated for the record, however, 
that such additional testimony was unnecessary (R. 71 
and 72). By this action respondent Commission r lear ly 
prevented, or at the very least, dissuaded petitioner from 
presenting such supportive testimony (R. 71, 72). 
Under these circumstances and in this posture, it is 
improper for the respondent Commission to now base 
its finding and order on a lack of competent evidence to 
support such incident as the cause of petitioner's hearing 
loss. Any such lack of evidence, if we assume, arguendo, 
it does exist, resulted solely from the position taken hy 
the Referee for respondent Commission at the hearing 
and not from the lack of, unavailability of, or failure of 
petitioner to be prepared 'vith such PvidenrP. 
In Cooper v. Industrial Commission of l Tfah (1963) 
387 P. 2d 689, the Utah Supreme Court held that it is an 
elemental principle of justice that a party seeking adjudi-
cation of his rights should not be neither prcvP11ted nor 
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dissuaded from presenting any evidence he desires \vhich 
is competent and material to the issues. See also H arlafJ~ 
v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 391 P. 2d 838. 
POINT III. 
'THAT PETITIONER'S HEARING DISABIL-
ITY IS COMPENSABLE TYPE OF ACCIDEX-
TAL INJURY PURSUANT TO TITLE 35, 
CHAPTER 1 OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
1953, AS A1\1:ENDED. 
Petitioner contends that the record establishes that 
petitioner suffered an accidental injury on August 31, 
1960, resulting in a permanent partial disability to his 
hearing. It is conceded that petitioner did suffer loss of 
hearing (R. 71) and petitioner believes that the conclu-
sion is inescapable that this hearing loss \Yas occasioned 
by an acoustic trauma resulting from the use of the air 
gun on August 31, 1960 (R. 22 through 31 and R. 68) and 
for the respondent Commission to rule otherwise is 
arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious. 
Prior to the hearing the only dispute bet"~een the 
respondent Commission and the petitioner \Yas the ex-
tent of petitioner's hearing impairment. ..At no time had 
the fact that petitioner had suffered an accidental injury 
while in the course of employment \Yith employer been 
raised. This is consistent "'"ith the apparent position 
taken by the Referee for the Commission at the time of 
the hearing (R. 71, 72). Yet the Commission bY its order 
now bases its denial of compensation on the ·conclusion 
that petitioner's hearing loss ,,,.as not the result of an 
accidental injury but '"'as, in fact, caused by an indus-
trial disease. 
The only competent medical testimony presented at 
the hearing \vas that of Dr. Gray, called by the petitioner. 
and that of Dr. Larson, 'vho is employed by emplover at 
its medieal dispensary. Petitioner contends it is l;nrea-
sonable for the Commission to attempt to justify its 
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conclusion on the report of the medical panel or the re-
ports of other doctors which did not testify at the hear-
ing. See Ha.ckford v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
358 P. 2d 899; Holla;nd v. In.dustria.l Commission. of Utah, 
297 P. 2d 230. 
Respondent Commission in supporting its order that 
petitioner did not suffer an accidental acoustical trauma 
purports to rely upon the testimony of Dr. Dean Gray 
and in its order states : 
"Dr. Dean W. Gray stated Page 29, Trs. that, 
'of course, obstruction of an auditory artery usual-
ly leads to abrupt and total hearing loss. Not al-
ways but frequently more than he has, and it gen-
erally is limited to one ear rather than both. Such 
as this man's had.' '' 
An examination of Dr. Gray's testimony demon-
strates, ho\vever, that the cited quotation is lifted out of 
context, is contra to his stated conclusions and is not;in 
fact, even correctly interpreted by the respondent Com-
mission (R. 29, 22, 23, 49 and 50). Dr. Gray clearly 
concluded in his testimony that from his O\vn examination 
and from the studies of l\Ir. Fingerle (Exhibit No. 7) 
that petitioner's loss of hearing resulted from an acoustic 
trauma occasioned by the use of the air gun on August 
31, 1960 (R. 22, 23, 49 and 50). 
Dr. Larson, who is not an ear specialist, and \Yho is 
employed by employer, does not attempt to controvert 
the conclusion reached by Dr. Gray in hiR testimony (R. 
59, 63, 64, 68 and 69). 
Significantly, none of the doctors employed by em-
ployer who actually examined petitioner at the time he 
reported to the dispensary were called as \ritncsses h~r 
respondent employer. Under these circumstanel)H pe-
titioner contends that all of the competent and material 
evidence which respondent Commission relies upon doeR 
not support its conclusion and order. Such evidence, in-
cluding the exhibits, at most establishes the posHibility 
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that petitioner had a pre-existing condition or a pro pen-
sity for acoustical trauma and that such condition o_r 
propensity was acted upon and aggravated by the acoust~­
cal trauma resulting from the use of the air gun by peti-
tioner. There is, in fact, no competent evidence to esta b-
lish a long exposure to loud noises, nor is petitioner's tes-
timony that he had never before used an air gun for the 
purpose of tamping sand into metal pipes refuted (R. 98) . 
. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed 
the proposition that the Workmen's Compensation Act 
should be liberally construed in favor of coverage of an 
employee. Askren v. Industrial Commission of Utah 
(1964), 391 P. 2d 302; Spencer v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 290 P. 2d 692; Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Com-
pany, 386 P. 2d 616, Jones v. California Packing Corp., 
244· P. 2d 640, and by courts of other jurisdictions, Crest 
Building Corpora.tion v. Lowe, 388 P. 2d 512 (Okla.): 
Adams v. Reid Roller Bit Co1npany, 335 P. 2d 1080 
(Okla.); Winkelman v. Boeing Airplane Co., 203 P. 2d 171 
(Kansas); American. Indemnity Company v. State Con1-
pensation Insurance Fund, 116 P. 2d 919 (Colo.). 
In reference to the interpretation of the word '' acci-
dent" as used in Section 35-1-45, the Utah Supreme Court 
made the follo,ving observation: 
"This very problem \vas discussed and legisla-
tures were advised that if the result reached in 
Fenton v. Thornley, supra, "~as intended .. the use 
of the term ''injury by accident,'' since its mean-
ing had been construed to mean only an unexpect-
ed result, \Yas desirable. Thereafter .. "Tith full 
access to that decision and article our legislature 
enacted our Workmen's Compensation La\Y and 
adopted the term 'injury by accident.' It is the 
familiar doctrine of statutory construction that 
\vhere a legislature adopts a statute \Yhich has 
already ?een construed, it usually adopts the 
construction placed thereon. Fuller-To ponce 
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Truck Co. v. Public Service Commission, 99 Utah 
28, 96 P. 2d 722. The conclusion is unavoidable 
that in so doing the legislature intended to adopt 
the construction given to those words by Fenton v. 
Thornley, supra. 
''This court has accordingly held over and 
over again that such was the meaning of that 
term . . . that the unexpected injury was all tha.t 
wa.s necessary.'' (emphasis added) 
See Purity Bisc~tit Company v. Industrial Commi-s-
sion, 201 P. 2d 961. 
In Jones v. California Packing Corp., 244 P. 2d 640, 
6-42, the Utah Supreme Court stated in reference to aggra-
vation of an existing condition as follows: 
"It is settled beyond question that a pre-exist-
ing disease or other disturbed condition or defect 
of the body, when aggravated or lighted up by an 
industrial accident, is compensable under the Act, 
Graybar Elec-tric Co., Inc., v. Industrial Comm., 
73 Utah 568, 276 P. 161; Thomas D. Dee Me-
morial Hospital Ass 'n v. Industrial Comm., 
104 Utah 61, 138 P. 2d 233. And also that an in-
ternal failure brought about by exertion in the 
course of employment may be an accident 'vithin 
the meaning of Sec. 42-1-43, U. C. A. 1943, (Sec. 
35-1-45, U. C. A. 1953) without the requirement 
that the injury results from some incident which 
happened suddenly and is identifiable at a definite 
time and place. '' 
See also Makoff Company v. Industrial Comtnission of 
U ta.h, 368 P. 2d 70. 
Thus, this Court is committed to the proposition that 
the Workmen's Compensation Act prescribes no standard 
of health necessary to bring an employee under the law 
and accidental injuries are compensable thereunder where 
the accident only serves to aggravate a pre-existing con-
25 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dition. Thus, petitioner contends that by all the sta~d­
ards of this Court a.pplica ble to the circumstances 1n-
volved herein and from the evidence adduced at the 
hearing, that petitioner suffered a compensable accid~nt, 
that being an unexpected and unforeseen loss of hearing 
as the result of using an air gun while employed by em-
ployer on August 31, 1960. This is not affected by the 
fact that such air gun procedures would not have pro-
duced this result upon another individual. 
Although there does not appear to be any specific 
rulings by the utah Supreme Court in reference to a 
trauma tic loss of hearing as a compensable accident, 
petitioner submits that the loss of hearing as the result 
of acoustic trauma is as much of an accident as a hernia 
resulting from muscular strain or nerve injury from 
poisonous gas. (In,jury and Dea.th Under TVor1nnen.'s 
Compen.sa.tion. Laws,. Samuel B. Horovitz, p. 76.) In 
Win.kelmwn v. Boeing Airplane Compa;ny, 203 P. 2d 171 
(I(ansas), the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "There 
an employee served as assistant instructor of guards at 
employer's indoor pistol range and employee lost his 
hearing because of volume, intensity and high pitch of 
gunfire explosions at rifle range, the employee sustained 
an ''injury'' by ''accident'' \vhich arose out of and in 
course of employment and his exclusiYe remedy was un-
der the Workmen's Compensation Act, and further held 
as f ollo,vs : 
'' ... Assuming traumatic deafness may in 
some sense properly be denominated an industrial 
disease, as it appears to be by some ""'Titers, the 
fact remains that here a portion of this man's 
physical structure \Yas definitelY broken do\Y11 bY 
accidental injury. For that inj~rY recoYery could 
have been had under our act. "\\T e think. under 
such circumstances 've "\Yould not be justified in 
denominating the injury solely and purelv an in-
dustrial disease and thereby deny a \York~an re-
covery under our act. To deny recoYery in this 
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situation would not, in our opinion, constitute lib-
eral, but strict and technical, interpretation of our 
act against a workman. Under our repeated de-
cisions \Ye are not permitted to give it such inter-
pretation.'' 
See also Great America.n Indemnity Co. v. State 
Compensation Insurance Fund (Colo.) 116 P. 2d 919 and 
Adams v. Reid Roller Bit Company (Okla.) 335 P. 2d. 
1080, 1084. 
CONCLUSION 
That the Commission has erred in denying the peti-
tioner an award for compensation and in its order which 
is contrary to the evidence and to the concepts laid down 
by this Court concerning the application of the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & ~fANGU~I 
ROBERT l\I. YEATES 
206 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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